Insik kwa silchon -- Si wa kwahak -- Isŏng ŭi siryŏn -- Ch'ŏrhak kwa si.

Gegenstand der Erörterung ist die Offenlegung des faktischen und potentiellen Ethikbezugs von Technik. Grundlegend für jede Ethik ist ein je bestimmtes Verständnis des Menschen und seiner Wirklichkeit. Diese prinzipielle Positionalität ist gegenüber diskurs- und verfahrensethischen Ansätzen ebenso festzuhalten wie gegenüber utilitaristischen Nivellierungen grundlagentheoretischer Fragen. Die vorliegende Untersuchung aus evangelischer Perspektive zeigt anhand der Analyse zweier technikphilosophischer Konzeptionen der Gegenwart (G. Ropohl, W. Ch. Zimmerli) die Relevanz von Technikethik nicht nur für Techniker, sondern bezüglich menschlichen Handelns im allgemeinen.

Ch'aek mŏri e -- 1. Ch'oe Han-gi ŭi sam kwa kŭ ŭi sidae -- 2. Silchŭng kwa siryong ŭi sirhakchŏk hangmun'gwan -- 3. Chujahak pip'an kwa Kihak ŭi hyŏngsŏng -- 4. Sŏyang kwahak kisul ŭi suyong kwa Kihakchŏk pyŏnyong -- 5. Insingnon ŭi chŏnhwan kwa kaekkwan insik ŭi pangbŏmnon -- 6. T'al Chujahakchŏk sayu ŭi chŏn'gae wa segye p'yŏnghwaron -- Kyŏllon : Chosŏn hugi Sirhak kwa Ch'oe Han-gi ŭi ch'ŏrhak.

Uju ŭi chuin ŭn nugu in'ga -- Kwahak ch'ŏrhak iran muŏt in'ga (1993) -- Kwahak kisul ŭi ch'ukpok kwa chaeang (Kwahak, ch'ukpok in'ga chaeang in'ga, 2009) -- Munmyŏng ŭi mirae -- Saengmyŏng -- Hwan'gyŏng kwa hwan'gyŏng ch'ŏrhak -- Saengt'ae.

This collection contains studies on justice, juridical reasoning and argumenta tion which contributed to my ideas on the new rhetoric. My reflections on justice, from 1944 to the present day, have given rise to various studies. The ftrst of these was published in English as The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument. The others, of which several are out of print or have never previously been published, are reunited in the present volume. As justice is, for me, the (...) prime example of a "confused notion", of a notion which, like many philosophical concepts, cannot be reduced to clarity without being distorted, one cannot treat it without recourse to the methods of reasoning analyzed by the new rhetoric. In actuality, these methods have long been put into practice by jurists. Legal reasoning is fertile ground for the study of argumentation: it is to the new rhetoric what mathematics is to formal logic and to the theory of demonstrative proof. It is important, then, that philosophers should not limit their methodologi cal studies to mathematics and the natural sciences. They must not neglect law in the search for practical reason. I hope that these essays lead to be a better understanding of how law can enrich philosophical thought. CH. P. (shrink)

This paper criticises necessitarianism, the thesis that there is at least one necessary truth; and defends possibilism, the thesis that all propositions are contingent, or that anything is possible. The second section maintains that no good conventionalist account of necessity is available, while the third section criticises model theoretic necessitarianism. The fourth section sketches some recent technical work on nonclassical logic, with the aim of weakening necessitarian intuitions and strengthening possibilist intuitions. The fifth section considers several a prioristic attempts at (...) demonstrating that there is at least one necessary proposition and finds them inadequate. The final section emphasises the epistemic aspect of possibilism. (shrink)

Modern logic has Wldergone some remarkable developments in the last hun dred years. These have contributed to the extraordinary use of formal logic which has become essentially the concern of mathematicians. This has led to attempts to identify logic with formal logic. The claim has even been made that all non-formal reasoning, to the extent that it cannot be formalized, no longer belongs to logic. This conception leads to a genuine impoverishment of logic as well as to a narrow conception (...) of reason. It means that as soon as demonstrative proofs are no longer available reason will no longer dominate. Even the idea of the 'reasonable' becomes foreign to logic and such expres sions as 'reasonable decisions', 'reasonable choice' or 'reasonable hypotheses' would be put aside as meaningless. The domain of action, including method ology and everything that is given over to deliberation or controversy - i.e., foreign to formal logic - would become a battleground where necessarily the reason of the strongest would always prevail. (shrink)

We investigate the “mathematical” strength of the theory I*2. In particular we prove the quadratic reciprocity law and Bertrand's postulate, using fragments of I*2 which employ some well-known number-theoretic functions.